1. IT might seem to have more convenience, though it come often
otherwise to pass, excellent King, that those, which are fruitful in
their generations, and have in themselves the foresight of
immortality in their descendants, should likewise be more careful of
the good estate of future times, unto which they know they must
transmit and commend over their dearest pledges. Queen Elizabeth was
a sojourner in the world in respect of her unmarried life, and was a
blessing to her own times; and yet so as the impression of her good
government, besides her happy memory, is not without some effect which
doth survive her. But to your Majesty, whom God hath already blessed
with so much royal issue, worthy to continue and represent you for
ever, and whose youthful and fruitful bed doth yet promise many of
the like renovations; it is proper and agreeable to be conversant not
only in the transitory parts of good government, but in those acts
also which are in their nature permanent and perpetual: amongst the
which, if affection do not transport me, there is not any more worthy
than the further endowment of the world with sound and fruitful
knowledge. For why should a few received authors stand up like
Hercules' columns, beyond which there should be no sailing or
discovering, since we have so bright and benign a star as your
Majesty to conduct and prosper us? To return therefore where we left,
it remaineth to consider of what kind those acts are which have been
undertaken and performed by kings and others for the increase and
advancement of learning: wherein I purpose to speak actively without
digressing or dilating.
2. Let this ground therefore be laid, that all works are overcome
by amplitude of reward, by soundness of direction, and by the
conjunction of labours. The first multiplieth endeavour, the second
preventeth error, and the third supplieth the frailty of man: but the
principal of these is direction: for CLAUDUS IN VIA ANTEVERTIT
CURSOREM EXTRA VIAM; and Salomon excellently setteth it down, IF THE
IRON BE NOT SHARP, IT REQUIRETH MORE STRENGTH; BUT WISDOM IS THAT WHICH
PREVAILETH; signifying that the invention or election of the mean is
more effectual than any inforcement or accumulation of endeavours.
This I am induced to speak, for that (not derogating from the noble
intention of any that have been deservers towards the state of
learning) I do observe, nevertheless, that their works and acts are
rather matters of magnificence and memory, than of progression and
proficience; and tend rather to augment the mass of learning in the
multitude of learned men, than to rectify or raise the sciences
themselves.
3. The works or acts of merit towards learning are conversant about
three objects: the places of learning, the books of learning, and the
persons of the learned. For as water, whether it be the dew of
heaven, or the springs of the earth, doth scatter and leese itself in
the ground, except it be collected into some receptacle, where it may
by union comfort and sustain itself, (and for that cause the industry
of [23] man hath made and framed spring-heads, conduits, cisterns,
and pools, which men have accustomed likewise to beautify and adorn
with accomplishments of magnificence and state, as well as of use and
necessity) so this excellent liquor of knowledge, whether it descend
from divine inspiration, or spring from human sense, would soon
perish and vanish to oblivion, if it were not preserved in books,
traditions, conferences, and places appointed, as universities,
colleges, and schools, for the receipt and comforting of the same.
4. The works which concern the seats and places of learning are four;
foundations and buildings, endowments with revenues, endowments with
franchises and privileges, institutions and ordinances for
government; all tending to quietness and privateness of life, and
discharge of cares and troubles; much like the stations which Virgil
prescribeth for the hiving of bees:
Principio sedes apibus statioque petenda,
Quo neque fit ventis aditus, etc.
5. The works touching books are two: first, libraries, which are as
the shrines where all the relics of the ancient saints, full of true
virtue, and that without delusion or imposture, are preserved and
reposed: secondly, new editions of authors, with more correct
impressions, more faithful translations, more profitable glosses,
more diligent annotations, and the like.
6. The works pertaining to the persons of learned men, besides the
advancement and countenancing of them in general, are two: the reward
and designation of readers in sciences already extant and invented;
and the reward and designation of writers and inquirers concerning
any parts of learning not sufficiently laboured and prosecuted.
7. These are summarily the works and acts, wherein the merits of
many excellent princes and other worthy personages have been
conversant. As for any particular commemorations, I call to mind what
Cicero said, when he gave general thanks; DIFFICILE NON ALIQUEM,
INGRATUM QUENQUAM PRAETERIRE. Let us rather, according to the
Scriptures, look unto that part of the race which is before us than
look back to that which is already attained.
8. First, therefore, amongst so many great foundations of colleges
in Europe, I find it strange that they are all dedicated to
professions, and none left free to arts and sciences at large. For if
men judge that learning should be referred to action, they judge
well; but in this they fall into the error described in the ancient
fable, in which the other parts of the body did suppose the stomach
had been idle, because it neither performed the office of motion, as
the limbs do, nor of sense, as the head doth; but yet,
notwithstanding, it is the stomach that digesteth and distributeth to
all the rest: so if any man think philosophy and universality to be
idle studies, he doth not consider that all professions are from
thence served and supplied. And this I take to be a great cause that
hath hindered the progression of learning, because these fundamental
knowledges have been studied but in passage. For if you will have a
tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it is not anything you
can do to the boughs, but it is the stirring of the earth and putting
new mould about the roots that must work it. Neither is it to be
forgotten, that this dedicating of foundations and dotations to
professory learning hath not only had a malign aspect and influence
upon the growth of sciences, but hath also been prejudicial to states
and governments. For hence it proceedeth that princes find a solitude
in regard of able men to serve them in causes of state, because there
is no education collegiate which is free; where such as were so
disposed might give themselves to histories, modern languages, books
of policy and civil discourse, and other the like enablements unto
service of estate.
9. And because Founders of Colleges do plant, and Founders of
Lectures do water, it followeth well in order to speak of the defect
which is in public lectures; namely, in the smallness and meanness of
the salary or reward which in most places is assigned unto them;
whether they be lectures of arts, or of professions. For it is
necessary to the progression of sciences that Readers be of the most
able and sufficient men; as those which are ordained for generating
and propagating of sciences, and not for transitory use. This cannot
be, except their condition and endowment be such as may content the
ablest man to appropriate his whole labour and continue his whole age
in that function and attendance; and therefore must have a proportion
answerable to that mediocrity or competency of advancement, which may
be expected from a profession or the practice of a profession. So as,
if you will have sciences flourish, you must observe David's military
law, which was, THAT THOSE WHICH STAID WITH THE CARRIAGE SHOULD HAVE
EQUAL PART WITH THOSE WHICH WERE IN THE ACTION, else will the
carriages be ill attended. So Readers in sciences are indeed the
guardians of the stores and provisions of sciences, whence men in
active courses are furnished, and therefore ought to have equal
entertainment with them: otherwise if the fathers in sciences be of the
weakest sort, or be ill-maintained,
Et patrum invalidi referent jejunia nati.
10. Another defect I note, wherein I shall need some alchemist to
help me, who call upon men to sell their books, and to build
furnaces; quitting and forsaking Minerva and the Muses as barren
virgins, and relying upon Vulcan. But certain it is, that unto the
deep, fruitful, and operative study of many sciences, especially
Natural Philosophy and Physic, books be not the only instrumentals;
wherein also the beneficence of men hath not been altogether wanting:
for we see spheres, globes, astrolabes, maps, and the like, have been
provided as appurtenances to astronomy and cosmography, as well as
books: we see likewise that some places instituted for physic have
annexed the commodity of gardens for simples of all sorts, and do
likewise command the use of dead bodies for anatomies. But these do
respect but a few things. In general, there will hardly be any main
proficience in the disclosing of [24] nature, except there be some
allowance for expenses about experiments; whether they be experiments
appertaining to Vulcanus or Daedalus, furnace or engine, or any other
kind: and therefore as secretaries and spials of princes and states
bring in bills for intelligence, so you must allow the spials and
intelligencers of nature to bring in their bills; or else you shall
be ill advertised.
11. And if Alexander made such a liberal assignation to Aristotle
of treasure for the allowance of hunters, fowlers, fishers, and the
like, that he might compile a History of Nature, much better do they
deserve it that travail in Arts of Nature.
12. Another defect which I note, is an intermission or neglect in
those which are governors in universities, of consultation, and in
princes or superior persons, of visitation: to enter into account and
consideration, whether the readings, exercises, and other customs
appertaining unto learning, anciently begun, and since continued, be
well instituted or no; and thereupon to ground an amendment or
reformation in that which shall be found inconvenient. For it is one
of your majesty's own most wise and princely maxims, THAT IN ALL
USAGES AND PRECEDENTS, THE TIMES BE CONSIDERED THEREIN THEY FIRST
BEGAN; WHICH, IF THEY WERE WEAK OR IGNORANT, IT DEROGATETH FROM THE
AUTHORITY OF THE USAGE, AND LEAVETH IT FOR SUSPECT. And therefore
inasmuch as most of the usages and orders of the universities were
derived from more obscure times, it is the more requisite they be
re-examined. In this kind I will give an instance or two, for example
sake, of things that are the most obvious and familiar. The one is a
matter, which though it be ancient and general, yet I hold to be an
error; which is, that scholars in universities come too soon and too
unripe to logic and rhetoric, arts fitter for graduates than children
and novices: for these two, rightly taken, are the gravest of
sciences, being the arts of arts; the one for judgment, the other for
ornament: and they be the rules and directions how to set forth and
dispose matter; and therefore for minds empty and unfraught with
matter, and which have not gathered that which Cicero calleth SYLVA
and SUPELLEX, stuff and variety, to begin with those arts (as if one
should learn to weigh, or to measure, or to paint the wind), doth
work but this effect, that the wisdom of those arts, which is great
and universal, is almost made contemptible, and is degenerate into
childish sophistry and ridiculous affectation. And further, the
untimely learning of them hath drawn on, by consequence, the
superficial and unprofitable teaching and writing of them, as fitteth
indeed to the capacity of children. Another is a lack I find in the
exercises used in the Universities, which do make too great a divorce
between invention and memory; for their speeches are either
premeditate, IN VERBIS CONCEPTIS, where nothing is left to invention,
or merely extemporal, where little is left to memory: whereas in life
and action there is least use of either of these, but rather of
intermixtures of premeditation and invention, notes and memory; so as
the exercise fitteth not the practice, nor the image the life; and it
is ever a true rule in exercises, that they be framed as near as may
be to the life of practice; for otherwise they do pervert the motions
and faculties of the mind, and not prepare them. The truth whereof is
not obscure, when scholars come to the practices of professions, or
other actions of civil life; which when they set into, this want is
soon found by themselves, and sooner by others. But this part, touching
the amendment of the institutions and orders of Universities, I will
conclude with the clause of Caesar's letter to Oppius and Balbus, HOC
QMEMADMODUM FIERI POSSIT, NONNULLA MIHI IN MENTEM VENIUNT, ET MULTA
REPERIRI POSSUNT; DE IIS REBUS ROGO VOS UT COGITATIONEM SUSCIPIATIS.
13. Another defect which I note, ascendeth a little higher than the
precedent: for as the proficience of learning consisteth much in the
orders and institutions of Universities in the same states and
kingdoms, so it would be yet more advanced, if there were more
intelligence mutual between the Universities of Europe than now there
is. We see there may be many orders and foundations, which though
they be divided under several sovereignties and territories, yet they
take themselves to have a kind of contract, fraternity, and
correspondence one with the other; insomuch as they have provincials
and generals. And surely, as nature createth brotherhood in families,
and arts mechanical contract brotherhoods in commonalties, and the
anointment of God superinduceth a brotherhood in kings and bishops;
so in like manner there cannot but be a fraternity in learning and
illumination, relating to that paternity which is attributed to God,
who is called the Father of illuminations or lights.
14. The last defect which I will note is, that there hath not been,
or very rarely been, any public designation of writers or inquirers
concerning such parts of knowledge as may appear not to have been
already sufficiently laboured or undertaken; unto which point it is an
inducement to enter into a view and examination what parts of
learning have been prosecuted, and what omitted: for the opinion of
plenty is among the causes of want, and the great quantity of books
maketh a show rather of superfluity than lack; which surcharge,
nevertheless, is not to be remedied by making no more books, but by
making more good books, which, as the serpent of Moses, might devour
the serpents of the enchanters.
15. The removing of all the defects formerly enumerated, except the
last, and of the active part also of the last (which is the
designation of writers), are OPERA BASILICA; towards which the
endeavours of a private man may be but as an image in a crossway,
that may point at the way, but cannot go it: but the inducing part of
the latter, which is the survey of learning, may be set forward by
private travail. Wherefore I will now attempt to make a general and
faithful perambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts
thereof lie fresh and waste, and not improved and converted by the
industry of man; to the end that such a plot made and recorded to
memory, may both minister light to any public designation, and also
serve to excite voluntary endeavours: wherein, nevertheless, my
purpose is at this time to note only omissions and deficiencies, and
not to make [25] any redargution of errors or incomplete
prosecutions; for it is one thing to set forth what ground lieth
unmanured, and another thing to correct ill husbandry in that which
is manured.
In the handling and undertaking of which work I am not ignorant what
it is that I do now move and attempt, nor insensible of mine own
weakness to sustain my purpose; but my hope is, that if my extreme
love to learning carry me too far, I may obtain the excuse of
affection; for that IT IS NOT GRANTED TO MAN TO LOVE AND TO BE WISE.
But I know well I can use no other liberty of judgment than I must
leave to others; and I for my part shall be indifferently glad either
to perform myself, or accept from another, that duty of humanity; NAM
QUI ERRANTI COMITER MONSTRAT VIAM, ETC. I do foresee likewise that of
those things which I shall enter and register as deficiencies and
omissions, many will conceive and censure that some of them are
already done and extant; others to be but curiosities, and things of
no great use; and others to be of too great difficulty, and almost
impossibility to be compassed and effected. But for the two first, I
refer myself to the particulars; for the last, touching
impossibility, I take it those things are to be held possible which
may be done by some person, though not by every one; and which may be
done by many, though not by any one; and which may be done in the
succession of ages, though not within the hour-glass of one man's
life; and which may be done by public designation, though not by
private endeavour. [--] But, notwithstanding, if any man will take to
himself rather that of Salomon, DICIT PIGER, LEO EST IN VIA, than
that of Virgil, POSSUNT QUIA POSSE VIDENTUR, I shall be content that my
labours be esteemed but as the better sort of wishes: for as it
asketh some knowledge to demand a question not impertinent, so it
required some sense to make a wish not absurd.
I. 1. THE parts of human learning have reference to the three parts
of man's understanding, which is the seat of learning: history to his
memory, poesy to his imagination, and philosophy to his reason.
Divine learning receiveth the same distribution; for the spirit of
man is the same, though the revelation of oracle and sense be
diverse: so as theology consisteth also of the history of the church;
of parables, which is divine poesy; and of holy doctrine or precept:
for as for that part which seemeth supernumerary, which is prophecy,
it is but Divine History; which hath that prerogative over human, as
the narration may be before the fact as well as after.
[Pp. 25-27:Tables: THE GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
MEMORY. IMAGINATION. REASON.]
[28] History is natural, civil, ecclesiastical, and literary;
whereof the first three I allow as extant, the fourth I note as
deficient. For no man hath propounded to himself the general state of
learning to be described and represented from age to age, as many
have done the works of nature, and the state civil and
ecclesiastical; without which the history of the world seemeth to me
to be as the statua of Polyphemus with his eye out; that part being
wanting which doth most show the spirit and life of the person: and
yet I am not ignorant that in divers particular sciences, as of the
jurisconsults, the mathematicians, the rhetoricians, the
philosophers, there are set down some small memorials of the schools,
authors, and books; and so likewise some barren relations touching
the invention of arts or usages.
2. But a just story of learning, containing the antiquities and
originals of knowledges and their sects, their inventions, their
traditions, their diverse administrations and managings, their
flourishings, their oppositions, decays, depressions, oblivions,
removes, with the causes and occasions of them, and all other events
concerning learning, throughout the ages of the world, I may truly
affirm to be wanting. [--] The use and end of which work I do not so
much design for curiosity or satisfaction of those that are the
lovers of learning, but chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose;
which is this in few words, that it will make learned men wise in the
use and administration of learning. For it is not St. Augustine's nor
St. Ambrose's works that will make so wise a divine, as
ecclesiastical history, thoroughly read and observed; and the same
reason is of learning.
3. History of nature is of three sorts; of nature in course, of
nature erring or varying, and of nature altered or wrought; that is,
history of creatures, history of marvels, and history of arts. [--]
The first of these, no doubt, is extant, and that in good perfection;
the two latter are handled so weakly and unprofitably, as I am moved
to note them as deficient. [--] For I find no sufficient or competent
collection of the works of nature which have a digression and
deflection from the ordinary course of generations, productions, and
motions; whether they be singularities of place and region, or the
strange events of time and chance, or the effects of yet unknown
properties, or the instances of exception to general kinds. It is
true, I find a number of books of fabulous experiments and secrets,
and frivolous impostures for pleasure and strangeness; but a
substantial and severe collection of the heteroclites or irregulars
of nature, well examined and described, I find not: especially not
with due rejection of fables and popular errors: for as things now
are, if an untruth in nature be once on foot, what by reason of the
neglect of examination and countenance of antiquity, and what by
reason of the use of the opinion in similitudes and ornaments of
speech, it is never called down.
4. The use of this work, honoured with a precedent in Aristotle, is
nothing less than to give contentment to the appetite of curious and
vain wits, as the manner of Mirabilaries is to do; but for two
reasons, both of great weight; the one to correct the partiality of
axioms and opinions, which are commonly framed only upon common and
familiar examples; the other because from the wonders of nature is
the nearest intelligence and passage towards the wonders of art: for
it is no more but by following, and as it were hounding nature in her
wanderings, to be able to lead her afterwards to the same place
again. [--] Neither am I of opinion, in this history of marvels, that
superstitious narrations of sorceries, witchcrafts, dreams,
divinations, and the like, where there is an assurance and clear
evidence of the fact, be altogether excluded. For it is not yet known
in what cases and how far effects attributed to superstition do
participate of natural causes: and therefore howsoever the practice
of such things is to be condemned, yet from the speculation and
consideration of them light may be taken, not only for the discerning
of the offences, but for the further disclosing of nature. Neither
ought a man to make scruple of entering into these things for
inquisition of truth, as your majesty hath showed in your own
example; who with the two clear eyes of religion and natural
philosophy have looked deeply and wisely into these shadows, and yet
proved yourself to be of the nature of the sun, which passeth through
pollutions and itself remains as pure as before. [--] But this I hold
fit, that these narrations, which have mixture with superstition, be
sorted by themselves, and not be mingled with the narrations which
are merely and sincerely natural. [--] But as for the narrations
touching the prodigies and miracles of religions, they are either not
true, or not natural; and therefore impertinent for the story of
nature.
5. For history of nature wrought or mechanical, I find some
collections made of agriculture, and likewise of manual arts; but
commonly with a rejection of experiments familiar and vulgar. [--]
For it is esteemed a kind of dishonour unto learning to descend to
inquiry or meditation upon matters mechanical, except they be such as
may be thought secrets, rarities, and special subtilities; which
humour of vain and supercilious arrogancy is justly derided in Plato;
where he brings in Hippias, a vaunting sophist, disputing with
Socrates, a true and unfeigned inquisitor of truth; where the subject
being touching beauty, Socrates, after his wandering manner of
inductions, put first an example of a fair virgin, and then of a fair
horse, and then of a fair pot well glazed, whereat Hippias was
offended, and said, MORE THAN FOR COURTESY'S SAKE, HE DID THINK MUCH
TO DISPUTE WITH ANY THAT DID ALLEGE SUCH BASE AND SORDID SUBSTANCES:
whereunto Socrates answered, YOU HAVE REASON, AND IT BECOMES YOU
WELL, BEING A MAN SO TRIM IN YOUR VESTMENTS, ETC., and so goeth on in
an irony. [--] But the truth is, they be not the highest instances
that give the securest information; as may be well expressed in the
tale so common of the philosopher, [29] that while he gazed upwards
to the stars fell into the water; for if he had looked down he might
have seen the stars in the water, but looking aloft he could not see
the water in the stars. So it cometh often to pass, that mean and
small things discover great, better than great can discover the
small: and therefore Aristotle noteth well, THAT THE NATURE OF
EVERYTHING IS BEST SEEN IN ITS SMALLEST PORTIONS. And for that cause
he inquireth the nature of a commonwealth, first in a family, and the
simple conjugations of man and wife, parent and child, master and
servant, which are in every cottage. Even so likewise the nature of
this great city of the world, and the policy thereof, must be first
sought in mean concordances and small portions. So we see how that
secret of nature, of the turning of iron touched with the loadstone
towards the north, was found out in needles of iron, not in bars of
iron.
6. But if my judgment be of any weight, the use of history
mechanical is of all others the most radical and fundamental towards
natural philosophy; such natural philosophy as shall not vanish in
the fume of subtile, sublime, or delectable speculation, but such as
shall be operative to the endowment and benefit of man's life: for it
will not only minister and suggest for the present many ingenious
practices in all trades, by a connection and transferring of the
observations of one art to the use of another, when the experiences
of several mysteries shall fall under the consideration of one man's
mind; but further, it will give a more true and real illumination
concerning causes and axioms than is hitherto attained. [--] For like
as a man's disposition is never well known till he be crossed, nor
Proteus ever changed shapes till he was straitened and held fast; so
the passages and variations of nature cannot appear so fully in the
liberty of nature, as in the trials and vexations of art.
II. 1. For civil history, it is of three kinds; not unfitly to be
compared with the three kinds of pictures or images: for of pictures
or images, we see some are unfinished, some are perfect, and some are
defaced. So of histories we may find three kinds, memorials, perfect
histories, and antiquities; for memorials are history unfinished, or
the first or rough draughts of history; and antiquities are history
defaced, or some remnants of history which have casually escaped the
shipwreck of time.
2. Memorials, or preparatory history, are of two sorts; whereof the
one may be termed commentaries, and the other registers. Commentaries
are they which set down a continuance of the naked events and
actions, without the motives or designs, the counsels, the speeches,
the pretexts, the occasions and other passages of action: for this is
the true nature of a commentary; though Caesar, in modesty mixed with
greatness, did for his pleasure apply the name of a commentary to the
best history of the world. Registers are collections of public acts,
as decrees of council, judicial proceedings, declarations and letters
of state, orations and the like, without a perfect continuance or
contexture of the thread of the narration.
3. Antiquities, or remnants of history, are, as was said, TANQUAM
TABULA NAUFRAGII, when industrious persons by an exact and scrupulous
diligence and observation, out of monuments, names, words, proverbs,
traditions, private records and evidences, fragments of stories,
passages of books that concern not story, and the like, do save and
recover somewhat from the deluge of time.
4. In these kinds of unperfect histories I do assign no deficience,
for they are TANQUAM IMPERFECTE MISTA; and therefore any deficience
in them is but their nature. [--] As for the corruptions and moths of
history, which are EPITOMES, the use of them deserveth to be
banished, as all men of sound judgment have confessed; as those that
have fretted and corroded the sound bodies of many excellent
histories, and wrought them into base and unprofitable dregs.
5. History, which may be called just and perfect history, is of
three kinds, according to the object which it propoundeth or
pretendeth to represent: for it either representeth a time, or a
person, or an actions. The first we call chronicles, the second
lives, and the third narrations or relations. [--] Of these, although
the first be the most complete and absolute kind of history, and hath
most estimation and glory, yet the second excelleth it in profit and
use, and the third in verity and sincerity. For history of times
representeth the magnitude of actions, and the public faces and
deportments of persons, and passeth over in silence the smaller
passages and motions of men and matters. [--] But such being the
workmanship of God, as He doth hang the greatest weight upon the
smallest wires, MAXIMA È MINIMIS SUSPENDENS, it comes therefore to
pass, that such histories do rather set forth the pomp of business
than the true and inward resorts thereof. But lives, if they be well
written, propounding to themselves a person to represent in whom
actions both greater and smaller, public and private, have a
commixture, must of necessity contain a more true, native, and lively
representation. So again narrations and relations of actions, as the
war of Peloponnesus, the expedition of Cyrus Minor, the conspiracy of
Catiline, cannot but be more purely and exactly true than histories
of times, because they may choose an argument comprehensible within
the notice and instructions of the writer: whereas he that
undertaketh the story of a time, especially of any length, cannot but
meet with many blanks and spaces which he must be forced to fill up
out of his own wit and conjecture.
6. For the History of Times, I mean of Civil History, the
providence of God hath made the distribution: for it hath pleased God
to ordain and illustrate two exemplar states of the world for arms,
learning, moral virtue, policy, and laws; the state of Graecia, and
the state of Rome; the histories whereof occupying the middle part of
time, have more ancient to them, histories which may by one common
name be termed the antiquities of the world: and after them histories
which may be likewise called by the name of modern history.
7. Now to speak of the deficiencies. As to the [30] heathen
antiquities of the world, it is in vain to note them for deficient:
deficient they are no doubt, consisting most of fables and fragments;
but the deficience cannot be holpen; for antiquity is like fame,
CAPUT INTER NUBILA CONDIT, her head is muffled from our sight. For
the history of the exemplar states, it is extant in good perfection.
Not but I could wish there were a perfect course of history for Graecia
from Theseus to Philopoemen (what time the affairs of Graecia were
drowned and extinguished in the affairs of Rome); and for Rome from
Romulus to Justinianus, who may be truly said to be ULTIMUS
ROMANORUM. In which sequences of story the text of Thucydides and
Xenophon in the one, and the texts of Livius, Polybius, Sallustius,
Caesar, Appianus, Tacitus, Herodianus in the other, to be kept entire
without any diminution at all, and only to be supplied and continued.
But this is a matter of magnificence, rather to be commended than
required: and we speak now of parts of learning supplemental and not
of supererogation.
8. But for modern histories, whereof there are some few very
worthy, but the greater part beneath mediocrity, (leaving the care of
foreign stories to foreign states, because I will not be CURIOSUS IN
ALIENA REPUBLICA,) I cannot fail to represent to your majesty the
unworthiness of the history of England in the main continuance
thereof, and the partiality and obliquity of that of Scotland in the
latest and largest author that I have seen: supposing that it would
be honour for your Majesty, and a work very memorable, if this island
of Great Britain, as it is now joined in monarchy for the ages to
come, so were joined in one history for the times passed; after the
manner of the Sacred History, which draweth down the story of the ten
tribes, and of the two tribes, as twins, together. And if it shall
seem that the greatness of this work may make it less exactly
performed, there is an excellent period of a much smaller compass of
time, as to the story of England; that is to say, from the uniting of
the Roses to the uniting of the kingdoms; a portion of time, wherein,
to my understanding, there hath been the rarest varieties that in
like number of successions of any hereditary monarchy hath been
known. For it beginneth with the mixed adoption of a crown by arms
and title: an entry by battle, an establishment by marriage, and
therefore times answerable, like waters after a tempest, full of
working and swelling, though without extremity of storm; but well
passed through by the wisdom of the pilot, being one of the most
sufficient kings of all the number. Then followeth the reign of a
king, whose actions, howsoever conducted, had much intermixture with
the affairs of Europe, balancing and inclining them variably; in
whose time also began that great alteration in the state
ecclesiastical, an action which seldom cometh upon the stage. Then
the reign of a minor: then an offer of a usurpation, though it was
but as FEBRIS EPHEMERA. Then the reign of a queen matched with a
foreigner: then of a queen that lived solitary and unmarried, and yet
her government so masculine, that it had greater impression and
operation upon the states abroad than it any ways received from
thence. And now last, this most happy and glorious event, that this
island of Britain, divided from all the world, should be united in
itself: and that oracle of rest, given to Aeneas, ANTIQUAM EXQUIRITE
MATREM, should now be performed and fulfilled upon the nations of
England and Scotland, being now reunited in the ancient mother name
of Britain, as a full period of all instability and peregrinations.
So that as it cometh to pass in massive bodies, that they have
certain trepidations and waverings before they fix and settle; so it
seemeth that by the providence of God this monarchy, before it was to
settle in your majesty and your generations, (in which I hope it is
now established for ever,) had these prelusive changes and varieties.
9. For lives, I do find it strange that these times have so little
esteemed the virtues of the times, as that the writing of lives
should be no more frequent. For although there be not many sovereign
princes or absolute commanders, and that states are most collected
into monarchies, yet are there many worthy personages that deserve
better than dispersed report or barren elogies. For herein the
invention of one of the late poets is proper, and doth well enrich
the ancient fiction: for he feigneth that at the end of the thread or
web of every man's life there was a little medal containing the
person's name, and that Time waited upon the shears; and as soon as
the thread was cut, caught the medals, and carried them to the river
of Lethe; and about the bank there were many birds flying up and
down, that would get the medals and carry them in their beak a little
while, and then let them fall into the river: only there were a few
swans, which if they got a name, would carry it to a temple where it
was consecrate. And although many men, more mortal in their affections
than in their bodies, do esteem desire of name and memory but as a
vanity and ventosity,
Animi nil magnae laudis egentes;
which opinion cometh from that root, NON PRIUS LAUDES CONTEMPSIMUS,
QUAM LAUDANDA FACERE DESIVIMUS: yet that will not alter Salomon's
judgment, MEMORIA JUSTI CUM LAUDIBUS, AT IMPIORUM NOMEN PUTRESCET:
the one flourisheth, the other either consumeth to present oblivion,
or turneth to an ill odour. [--] And therefore in that style or
addition, which is and hath been long well received and brought in
use, FELICIS MEMORIAE, PIAE MEMORIAE, BONAE MEMORIAE, we do
acknowledge that which Cicero saith, borrowing it from Demosthenes,
that BONA FAMA PROPRIA POSSESSIO DEFUNCTORUM; which possession I
cannot but note that in our times it lieth much waste, and that
therein there is a deficience.
10. For narrations and relations of particular actions, there were
also to be wished a greater diligence therein; for there is no great
action but hath some good pen which attends it. [--] And because it
is an ability not common to write a good history, as may well appear
by the small number of them; yet if particularity of actions
memorable were but tolerably reported as they pass, the compiling of
a complete history of times might [31] be the better expected, when a
writer should arise that were fit for it: for the collection of such
relations mought be as a nursery garden, whereby to plant a fair and
stately garden, when time should serve.
11. There is yet another portion of history which Cornelius Tacitus
maketh, which is not to be forgotten, especially with that
application which he accoupleth it withal, annals and journals:
appropriating to the former matters of estate, and to the latter acts
and accidents of a meaner nature. For giving but a touch of certain
magnificent buildings, he addeth CUM EX DIGNITATE POPULI ROMANI
REPERTUM SIT, RES ILLUSTRES ANNALIBUS TALIA DIURNIS URBIS ACTIS
MANDARE. So as there is a kind of contemplative heraldry, as well as
civil. And as nothing doth derogate from the dignity of a state more
than confusion of degrees; so it doth not a little embase the
authority of a history, to intermingle matters of triumph, or matters
of ceremony, or matters of novelty, with matters of state. But the
use of a journal hath not only been in the history of time, but
likewise in the history of persons, and chiefly of actions; for
princes in ancient time had, upon point of honour and policy both,
journals kept of what passed day by day: for we see the chronicle
which was read before Ahasuerus, when he could not take rest,
contained matter of affairs indeed, but such as had passed in his own
time, and very lately before: but the journal of Alexander's house
expressed every small particularity, even concerning his person and
court; and it is yet a use well received in enterprises memorable, as
expeditions of war, navigations, and the like, to keep diaries of
that which passeth continually.
12. I cannot likewise be ignorant of a form of writing which some
wise and grave men have used, containing a scattered history of those
actions which they have thought worthy of memory, with politic
discourse and observation thereupon: not incorporate into the
history, but separately, and as the more principal in their
intention; which kind of ruminated history I think more fit to place
amongst books of policy, whereof we shall hereafter speak; than
amongst books of history: for it is the true office of history to
represent the events themselves together with the counsels, and to
leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and
faculty of every man's judgment. But mixtures are things irregular,
whereof no man can define.
13. So also is there another kind of history manifoldly mixed, and
that is history of cosmography: being compounded of natural history,
in respect of the regions themselves; of history civil, in respect of
the habitations, regiments, and manners of the people; and the
mathematics, in respect of the climates and configurations towards
the heavens: which part of learning of all others in this latter time
hath obtained most proficience. For it may be truly affirmed to the
honour of these times, and in a virtuous emulation with antiquity,
that this great building of the world had never through-lights made
in it, till the age of us and our fathers: for although they had
knowledge of the Antipodes,
Nosque ubi primus equis
Oriens afflavit anhelis,
Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper:
yet that mought be by demonstration, and not in fact; and if by
travel, it requireth the voyage but of half the globe. But to circle
the earth, as the heavenly bodies do, was not done or enterprised
till these latter times: and therefore these times may justly bear in
their word, not only PLUS ULTRA, in precedence of the ancient NON
ULTRA, and IMITABILE FULMEN, in precedence of the ancient NON
IMITABILE FULMEN,
Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen; etc.
but likewise IMITABILE COELUM; in respect of the many memorable
voyages after the manner of heaven about the globe of the earth.
14. And this proficience in navigation and discoveries may plant
also an expectation of the further proficience and augmentation of
all sciences; because it may seem they are ordained by God to be
coevals, that is, to meet in one age. For so the prophet Daniel,
speaking of the latter times, foretelleth PLURIMI PERTRANSIBUNT, ET
MULTIPLEX ERIT SCIENTIA: as if the openness and thorough passage of
the world and the increase of knowledge were appointed to be in the
same ages; as we see it is already performed in great part; the
learning of these latter times not much giving place to the former
two periods or returns of learning, the one of the Grecians, the
other of the Romans.
III. 1. History ecclesiastical receiveth the same divisions with
history civil: but further, in the propriety thereof, may be divided
into the history of the church, by a general name; history of
prophecy; and history of providence. The first describeth the times of
the militant church, whether it be fluctuant, as the ark of Noah; or
moveable, as the ark in the wilderness; or at rest, as the ark in the
temple: that is, the state of the church in persecution, in remove,
and in peace. This part I ought in no sort to note as deficient; only
I would that the virtue and sincerity of it were according to the
mass and quantity. But I am not now in hand with censures, but with
omissions.
2. The second, which is history of prophecy, consisteth of two
relatives, the prophecy, and the accomplishment; and therefore the
nature of such a work ought to be, that every prophecy of the
Scripture be sorted with the event fulfilling the same, throughout
the ages of the world; both for better confirmation of faith, and for
the better illumination of the Church touching those parts of
prophecies which are yet unfulfilled: allowing nevertheless that
latitude which is agreeable and familiar unto divine prophecies;
being of the nature of their Author, with whom a thousand years are
but as one day; and therefore are not fulfilled punctually at once,
but have springing and germinant accomplishment throughout many ages;
though the height or fulness of them may refer to some one age. [--]
This is a work which I find deficient; but is to be done with wisdom,
sobriety, and reverence, or not at all.
3. The third, which is history of providence, [32] containeth that
excellent correspondence which is between God's revealed will and His
secret will: which though it be so obscure, as for the most part it is
not legible to the natural man; no, nor many times to those that
behold it from the Tabernacle; yet at some times it pleaseth God, for
our better establishment and the confuting of those which are as
without God in the world, to write it in such text and capital
letters, that as the prophet saith, HE THAT RUNNETH BY MAY READ IT,
that is, mere sensual persons, which hasten by God's judgments, and
never bend or fix their cogitations upon them, are nevertheless in
their passage and race urged to discern it. Such are the notable
events and examples of God's Judgments, chastisements, deliverances,
and blessings: and this is a work which hath passed through the
labour of many, and therefore I cannot present as omitted.
4. There are also other parts of learning which are appendices to
history: for all the exterior proceedings of man consist of words and
deeds: whereof history doth properly receive and retain in memory the
deeds: and if words, yet but as inducements and passages to deeds: so
are there other books and writings, which are appropriate to the
custody and receipt of words only; which likewise are of three sorts:
orations, letters, and brief speeches or sayings. [--] Orations are
pleadings, speeches of counsel, laudatives, inventives, apologies,
reprehensions, orations of formality or ceremony, and the like. [--]
Letters are according to all the variety of occasions,
advertisements, advices, directions, propositions, petitions,
commendatory, expostulatory, satisfactory, of compliment, of pleasure,
of discourse, and all other passages of action. And such as are
written from wise men, are of all the words of man, in my judgment,
the best; for they are more natural than orations and public
speeches, and more advised than conferences or present speeches. So
again letters of affairs from such as manage them, or are privy to
them, are of all others the best instructions for history, and to a
diligent reader the best histories in themselves. [--] For
Apophthegms, it is a great loss of that book of Caesar's; for as his
history, and those few letters of his which we have, and those
apophthegms which were of his own, excel all men's else, so I suppose
would his collection of Apophthegms have done; for as for those which
are collected by others, either I have no taste in such matters, or
else their choice hath not been happy. But upon these three kinds of
writings I do not insist, because I have no deficiencies to propound
concerning them.
5. Thus much therefore concerning history; which is that part of
learning which answereth to one of the cells, domiciles, or offices
of the mind of man: which is that of memory.
IV. 1. Poesy is a part of learning in measure of words for the most
part restrained, but in all other points extremely licensed, and doth
truly refer to the imagination; which, being not tied to the laws of
matter, may at pleasure join that which nature hath severed, and
sever that which nature hath joined; and so make unlawful matches and
divorces of things; PICTORIBUS ATQUE POETIS, ETC. It is taken in two
senses in respect of words or matter; in the first sense it is but a
character of style, and belongeth to arts of speech, and is not
pertinent for the present: in the latter it is, as hath been said,
one of the principal portions of learning, and is nothing else but
feigned history, which may be styled as well in prose as in verse.
2. The use of this feigned history hath been to give some shadow of
satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of
things doth deny it, the world being in proportion inferior to the
soul; by reason whereof there is, agreeable to the spirit of man, a
more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more absolute
variety, than can be found in the nature of things. Therefore,
because the acts or events of true history have not that magnitude
which satisfieth the mind of man, poesy feigneth acts and events
greater and more heroical: because true history propoundeth the
successes and issues of actions not so agreeable to the merits of
virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them more just in
retribution, and more according to revealed providence: because true
history representeth actions and events more ordinary, and less
interchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness, and
more unexpected and alternative variations: so as it appeareth that
poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality, and to
delectation. And therefore it was ever thought to have some
participation of divineness, because it doth raise and erect the mind,
by submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind; whereas
reason doth buckle and bow the mind into the nature of things. [--]
And we see, that by these insinuations and congruities with man's
nature and pleasure, joined also with the agreement and comfort it
hath with music, it hath had access and estimation in rude times and
barbarous regions, where other learning stood excluded.
3. The division of Poesy which is aptest in the propriety thereof
(besides those divisions which are common unto it with history, as
feigned chronicles, feigned lives, and the appendices of history, as
feigned epistles, feigned orations, and the rest) is into poesy
narrative, representative, and allusive. [--] The Narrative is a mere
imitation of history, with the excesses before remembered; choosing
for subject commonly wars and love, rarely state, and sometimes
pleasure or mirth. [--] Representative is as a visible history; and
is an image of actions as if they were present, as history is of
actions in nature as they are (that is) past. [--] Allusive or
Parabolical is a Narrative applied only to express some special
purpose or conceit. Which latter kind of parabolical wisdom was much
more in use in the ancient times, as by the fables of Aesop, and the
brief sentences of the Seven, and the use of hieroglyphics may
appear. And the cause was, for that it was then of necessity to
express any point of reason which was more sharp or subtile than the
vulgar in that manner, because men in those [33] times wanted both
variety of examples and subtility of conceit: and as hieroglyphics
were before letters, so parables were before arguments: and
nevertheless now, and at all times, they do retain much life and
vigour; because reason cannot be so sensible, nor examples so fit.
4. But there remaineth yet another use of Poesy Parabolical,
opposite to that which we last mentioned: for that tendeth to
demonstrate and illustrate that which is taught or delivered, and
this other to retire and obscure it: that is, when the secrets and
mysteries of religion, policy, or philosophy, are involved in fables
or parables. Of this in divine poesy we see the use is authorized. In
heathen poesy we see the exposition of fables doth fall out sometimes
with great felicity; as in the fable that the giants being overthrown
in their war against the gods, the Earth their mother in revenge
thereof brought forth Fame:
Illam terra parens, irâ irritata Deorum,
Extremam, ut perhibent,
Coelo Enceladoque sororem Progenuit:
Expounded, that when princes and monarchs have suppressed actual
and open rebels, then the malignity of the people, which is the
mother of rebellion, doth bring forth libels and slanders, and
taxations of the states, which is of the same kind with rebellion,
but more feminine. So in the fable, that the rest of the gods having
conspired to bind Jupiter, Pallas called Briareus with his hundred
hands to his aid: expounded, that monarchies need not fear any
curbing of their absoluteness by mighty subjects, as long as by wisdom
they keep the hearts of the people, who will be sure to come in on
their side. So in the fable, that Achilles was brought up under
Chiron the Centaur, who was part a man and part a beast, expounded
ingeniously but corruptly by Machiavel, that it belongeth to the
education and discipline of princes to know as well how to play the
part of the lion in violence, and the fox in guile, as of the man in
virtue and justice. [--] Nevertheless, in many the like encounters, I
do rather think that the fable was first, and the exposition devised,
than that the moral was first, and thereupon the fable framed. For I
find it was an ancient vanity in Chrysippus, that troubled himself
with great contention to fasten the assertions of the Stoics upon the
fictions of the ancient poets; but yet that all the fables and
fictions of the poets were but pleasure and not figure, I interpose
no opinion. [--] Surely of those poets which are now extant, even
Homer himself (notwithstanding he was made a kind of Scripture by the
latter schools of the Grecians), yet I should without any difficulty
pronounce that his fables had no such inwardness in his own meaning;
but what they might have upon a more original tradition, is not easy
to alarm; for he was not the inventor of many of them.
5. In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I can report no
deficience, For being as a plant that cometh of the lust of the
earth, without a formal seed, it hath sprung up and spread abroad
more than any other kind. But to ascribe unto it that which is due, for
the expressing of affections, passions, corruptions, and customs, we
are beholding to poets more than to the philosophers' works; and for
wit and eloquence, not much less than to orators' harangue. But it is
not good to stay too long in the theatre. Let us now pass on to the
judicial place or palace of the mind, which we are to approach and
view with more reverence and attention.
V. 1. The knowledge of man is as the waters, some descending from
above, and some springing from beneath; the one informed by the light
of nature, the other inspired by divine revelation. [--] The light of
nature consisteth in the notions of the mind and the reports of the
senses: for as for knowledge which man receiveth by teaching, it is
cumulative and not original; as in a water that besides his own
spring-head is fed with other springs and streams. So then, according
to these two differing illuminations or originals, knowledge is first
of all divided into divinity and philosophy.
2. In Philosophy, the contemplations of man do either penetrate
unto God, -- or are circumferred to nature,-- or are reflected or
reverted upon himself. Out of which several inquiries there do arise
three knowledges, divine philosophy, natural philosophy, and human
philosophy or humanity. For all things are marked and stamped with
this triple character of the power of God, the difference of nature
and the use of man. But because the distributions and partitions of
knowledge are not like several lines that meet in one angle, and so
touch but in a point; but are like branches of a tree, that meet in a
stem, which hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and
continuance, before it come to discontinue and break itself into arms
and boughs: therefore it is good, before we enter into the former
distribution, to erect and constitute one universal science, by the
name of PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA, primitive or summary philosophy, as the
main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide
themselves; which science whether I should report as deficient or no,
I stand doubtful. [--] For I find a certain rhapsody of natural
theology, and of divers parts of logic; and of that part of natural
philosophy which concerneth the principles, and of that other part of
natural philosophy which concerneth the soul or spirit; all these
strangely commixed and confused; but being examined, it seemeth to me
rather a depredation of other sciences, advanced and exalted unto
some height of terms, than anything solid or substantive of itself.
[--] Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is
current, that the same things are handled but in several respects. As
for example, that logic considereth of many things as they are in
notion, and this philosophy as they are in nature; the one in
appearance, the other in existence; but I find this difference better
made than pursued. For if they had considered quantity, similitude,
diversity, and the rest of those extern characters of things, as
philosophers, and in nature, their inquiries must of force have been of
a far other kind than they are. [34] [--] For doth any of them, in
handling quantity, speak of the force of union, how and how far it
multiplieth virtue? Doth any give the reason, why some things in
nature are so common, and in so great mass, and others so rare, and
in so small quantity? Doth any, in handling similitude and diversity,
assign the cause why iron should not move to iron, which is more
like, but move to the lode-stone, which is less like? Why in all
diversities of things there should be certain participles in nature,
which are almost ambiguous to which kind they should be referred? But
there is a mere and deep silence touching the nature and operation of
those common adjuncts of things, as in nature: and only a resuming
and repeating of the force and use of them in speech or argument.
[--] Therefore, because in a writing of this nature, I avoid all
subtility, my meaning touching this original or universal philosophy
is thus, in a plain and gross description by negative: THAT IT BE A
RECEPTACLE FOR ALL SUCH PROFITABLE OBSERVATIONS AND AXIOMS AS FALL
NOT WITHIN THE COMPASS OF ANY OF THE SPECIAL PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY OR
SCIENCES, BUT ARE MORE COMMON AND OF A HIGHER STAGE.
3. Now that there are many of that kind need not to be doubted. For
example: is not the rule, SI INAEQUALIBUS AEQUALIA ADDAS, OMNIA ERUNT
INAEQUALIA, an axiom as well of justice as of the mathematics? and
is there not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive
justice, and arithmetical and geometrical proportion? Is not that other
rule, QUAE IN EODEM TERTIO CONVENIUNT, ET INTER SE CONVENIUNT, a rule
taken from the mathematics, but so potent in logic as all syllogisms
are built upon it? Is not the observation, OMNIA MUTANTUR, NIL
INTERIT, a contemplation in philosophy thus, that the quantum of
nature is eternal? in natural theology thus, that it requireth the
same Omnipotence to make somewhat nothing, which at the first made
nothing somewhat? according to the Scripture, DIDICI QUOD OMNIA
OPERA, QUAE FECIT DEUS, PERSERVERENT IN PERPETUA; NON POSSOMUS EIS
QUICQUAM ADDERE NEC AUFERRE. Is not the ground, which Machiavel
wisely and largely discourseth concerning governments, that the way
to establish and preserve them, is to reduce them AD PRINCIPIA, a
rule in religion and nature, as well as in civil administration? Was
not the Persian magic a reduction or correspondence of the principles
and architectures of nature to the rules and policy of governments?
Is not the precept of a musician, to fall from a discord or harsh
accord upon a concord or sweet accord, alike true in affection. Is
not the trope of music, to avoid or slide from the close or cadence,
common with the trope of rhetoric of deceiving expectation? Is not
the delight of the quavering upon a stop in music the same with the
playing of light upon the water?
--------------Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus.
Are not the organs of the senses of one kind with the organs of
reflection, the eye with a glass, the ear with a cave or strait
determined and bounded? Neither are these only similitudes, as men of
narrow observation may conceive them to be, but the same footsteps of
nature, treading or printing upon several subjects or matters. [--]
This science, therefore, as I understand it, I may justly report as
deficient; for I see sometimes the profounder sort of wits in
handling some particular argument will now and then draw a bucket of
water out of this well for their present use; but the spring-head
thereof seemeth to me not to have been visited; being of so excellent
use, both for the disclosing of nature, and the abridgment of art.
VI.1. This science being therefore first placed as a common parent,
like unto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly issue,
Omnes Coelicolas, omnes supera alta tenentes,
we may return to the former distribution of the three philosophies,
divine, natural, and human. [--] And as concerning divine philosophy
or natural theology, it is that knowledge or rudiment of knowledge
concerning God, which may be obtained by the contemplation of His
creatures; which knowledge may be truly termed drwe in respect of the
object, and natural in respect of the light. The bounds of this
knowledge are, that it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to
inform religion: and therefore there was never miracle wrought by God
to convert an atheist, because the light of nature might have led him
to confess a God: but miracles have been wrought to convert idolators
and the superstitious, because no light of nature extendeth to
declare the will and true worship of God. [--] For as all works do show
forth the power and skill of the workman, and not his image; so it is
of the works of God, which do show the omnipotency and wisdom of the
Maker, but not His image: and therefore therein the heathen opinion
differeth from the sacred truth; for they supposed the world to be
the image of God, and man to be an exact or compendious image of the
world, but the Scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute to the world
that honour, as to be the image of God, but only the work of His
hands neither do they speak of any other image of God, but man:
wherefore by the contemplation of nature to induce and perforce the
acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate His power, providence, and
goodness, is an excellent argument, and hath been excellently handled
by divers.
But on the other side, out of the contemplation of nature, or
ground of human knowledge, to induce any verity or persuasion
concerning the points of faith, is in my judgment not safe: DA FIDEI
QUAE FIDEI SUNT. For the heathens themselves conclude as much in that
excellent and divine fable of the golden chain: THAT MEN AND GODS
WERE NOT ABLE TO DRAW JUPITER DOWN TO THE EARTH; BUT CONTRARIWISE,
JUPITER WAS ABLE TO DRAW THEM UP TO HEAVEN. [--] So as we ought not
to attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of God to our reason;
but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason to the divine truth.
So as in this part of knowledge, touching divine philosophy, I am so
far from noting any deficience, as I rather note an excess: whereunto I
have digressed because of the extreme [35] prejudice which both
religion and philosophy have received and may receive, by being
commixed together; as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical
religion, and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy.
2. Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which is an
appendix of theology both divine and natural, and is neither
inscrutable nor interdicted; for although the Scripture saith, LET NO
MAN DECEIVE YOU IN SUBLIME DISCOURSE TOUCHING THE WORSHIP OF ANGELS,
PRESSING INTO THAT HE KNOWETH NOT, ETC., yet notwithstanding, if you
observe well that precept, it may appear thereby that there be two
things only forbidden, adoration of them, and opinion fantastical of
them, either to extol them further than appertaineth to the degree of
a creature, or to extol a man's knowledge of them further than he
hath ground. But the sober and grounded inquiry, which may arise out
of the passages of holy Scriptures, or out of the gradations of
nature, is not restrained. So of degenerate and revolted spirits, the
conversing with them or the employment of them is prohibited, much
more any veneration towards them; but the contemplation or science of
their nature, their power, their illusions, either by Scripture or
reason, is a part of spiritual wisdom. For so the apostle saith, WE
ARE NOT IGNORANT OF HIS STRATAGEMS. And it is no more unlawful to
inquire the nature of evil spirits, than to inquire the force of
poisons in nature, or the nature of sin and vice in morality. But this
part touching angels and spirits I cannot note as deficient, for many
have occupied themselves in it; I may rather challenge it, in many
of the writers thereof, as fabulous and fantastical.
VII. 1. Leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural theology
(not Divinity or inspired theology, which we reserve for the last of
all, as the haven and sabbath of all man's contemplations), we will
now proceed to natural philosophy.
If then it be true that Democritus said, THAT THE TRUTH OF NATURE
LIETH HID IN CERTAIN DEEP MINES AND CAVES, and if it be true likewise
that the alchemists do so much inculcate, that Vulcan is a second
nature, and imitateth that dexterously and compendiously, which
nature worketh by ambages and length of time, it were good to divide
natural philosophy into the mine and the furnace: and to make two
professions or occupations of natural philosophers, some to be
pioneers and some smiths; some to dig, and some to refine and hammer:
and surely I do best allow of a division of that kind, though in more
familiar and scholastical terms; namely, that these be the two parts
of natural philosophy, -- the inquisition of causes, and the
production of sects; speculative, and operable; natural science and
natural prudence. [--] For as in civil matters there is a wisdom of
discourse and a wisdom of direction; so is it in natural. And here I
will make a request, that for the latter, or at least for a part
thereof, I may revive and reintegrate the misapplied and abused name of
natural magic, which, in the true sense, is but natural wisdom, or
natural prudence; taken according to the ancient acception, purged
from vanity and superstition. Now although it be true, and I know it
well, that there is an intercourse between causes and effects, so as
both these knowledges, speculative and operative, have a great
connection between themselves; yet because all true and fruitful
natural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and
descendent; ascending from experiments to the invention of causes,
and descending from causes to the invention of new experiments;
therefore I judge it most requisite that these two parts be severally
considered and handled.
2. Natural science or theory is divided into physique and
metaphysiqme: wherein I desire it may be conceived that I use the
word metaphysique in a differing sense from that that is received:
and in like manner, I doubt not but it will easily appear to men of
judgment, that in this and other particulars, wheresoever my
conception and notion may differ from the ancient, yet I am studious
to keep the ancient terms. [--] For hoping well to deliver myself
from mistaking, by the order and perspicuous expressing of that I do
propound, I am otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as little
from antiquity, either in terms or opinions, as may stand with truth
and the proficience of knowledge. [--] And herein I cannot a little
marvel at the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in such a
spirit of difference and contradiction towards all antiquity:
undertaking not only to frame new words of science at pleasure, but
to confound and extinguish all ancient wisdom: insomuch as he never
nameth or mentioneth an ancient author or opinion, but to confute and
reprove; wherein for glory, and drawing followers and disciples, he
took the right course. [--] For certainly there cometh to pass and
hath place in human truth, that which was noted and pronounced in the
highest truth: VENI IN NOMINE PATRIS, NEC RECIPITIS ME; SI QUIS
VENERIT IN NOMINE SUO EUM RECIPIETIS. But in this divine aphorism,
(considering to whom it was applied, namely to Antichrist, the
highest deceiver,) we may discern well that the coming in a man's own
name, without regard of antiquity or paternity, is no good sign of
truth, although it be joined with the fortune and success of an EUM
RECIPIETIS. [--] But for this excellent person Aristotle, I will
think of him that he learned that humour of his scholar, with whom,
it seemeth, he did emulate, the one to conquer all opinions, as the
other to conquer all nations; wherein nevertheless, it may be, he may
at some men's hands that are of a bitter disposition get a like title
as his scholar did:
Felix terrarum praedo, non utile mundo
Editus exemplum, etc.
So
Felix doctrinae praedo.
But to me, on the other side, that do desire as much as lieth in my
pen to ground a sociable intercourse between antiquity and
proficience, it seemeth best to keep way with antiquity USQUE AD
ARAS; and therefore to retain the ancient terms, though I sometimes
alter the uses and definitions; according to [36] the moderate
proceeding in civil government; where although there be some
alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, EADEM
MAGISTRATUUM VOCABULA.
3. To return therefore to the use and acceptation of the term
Metaphysique, as I do now understand the word; it appeareth, by that
which hath been already said, that I intend PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA,
Summary Philosophy, and Metaphysique, which heretofore have been
confounded as one, to be two distinct things. For the one I have made
as a parent or common ancestor to all knowledge; and the other I have
now brought in as a branch or descendent of natural science. It
appeareth likewise that I have assigned to Summary Philosophy the
common principles and axioms which are promiscuous and indifferent to
several sciences: I have assigned unto it likewise the inquiry
touching the operation of the relative and adventive characters of
essences, as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility, and the
rest: with this distinction and provision; that they be handled as
they have efficacy in nature, and not logically. It appeareth
likewise that Natural Theology, which heretofore hath been handled
confusedly with Metaphysique, I have inclosed and bounded by itself.
[--] It is therefore now a question which is left remaining for
Metaphysique; wherein I may without prejudice preserve thus much of
the conceit of antiquity, that Physique should contemplate that which
is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory; and Metaphysique that
which is abstracted and fixed. [--] And again, that Physique should
handle that which supposeth in nature only a being and moving; and
Metaphysique should handle that which supposeth further in nature a
reason, understanding, and platform. But the difference,
perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and sensible. [--] For as
we divided natural philosophy in general into the inquiry of causes,
and productions of sects: so that part which concerneth the inquiry
of causes we do subdivide according to the received and found
division of causes; the one part, which is Physique, inquireth and
handleth the material and scient causes; and the other, which is
Metaphysique, handleth the formal and final causes.
4. Physique, taking it according to the derivation, and not
according to our idiom for medicine, is situate in a middle term or
distance between Natural History and Metaphysique. For natural
history describeth the variety of things; physique, the causes, but
variable or respective causes; and metaphysique, the fixed and
constant causes.
Limus ut hic durescit, et haec ut cera liquescit,
Uno eodemque igni:
Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay; fire is
the cause of colliquation, but respective to wax; but fire is no
constant cause either of induration or colliquation: so then the
physical causes are but the efficient and the matter. [--] Physique
hath three parts; whereof two respect nature united or collected, the
third contemplateth nature diffused or distributed. [--] Nature is
collected either into one entire total, or else into the same
principles or seeds. So as the first doctrine is touching the
contexture or configuration of things, as DE MUNDO, DE UNIVERSITATE
RERUM. [--] The second is the doctrine concerning the principles or
originals of times. [--] The third is the doctrine concerning all
variety and particularity of things; whether it be of the differing
substances, or their differing qualities and natures; whereof there
needeth no enumeration, this part being but as a gloss, or
paraphrase, that attendeth upon the text of natural history. [--] Of
these three I cannot report any as deficient. In what truth or
perfection they are handled, I make not now any judgment; but they
are parts of knowledge not deserted by the labour of man.
5. For Metaphysique, we have assigned unto it the inquiry of formal
and final causes; which assignation, as to the former of them, may
seem to be nugatory and void; because of the received and inveterate
opinion that the inquisition of man is not competent to find out
essential Forms or true differences: of which opinion we will take
this hold, that the invention of Forms is of all other parts of
knowledge the worthiest to be sought, if it be possible to be found.
[--] As for the possibility, they are ill discoverers that think
there is no land, when they can see nothing but sea. [--] But it is
manifest that Plato, in his opinion of Ideas, as one that had a wit
of elevation situate as upon a cliff, did descry, THAT FORMS WERE THE
TRUE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE; but lost the real fruit of his opinion, by
considering of Forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not
confined and determined by matter; and so turning his opinion upon
theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected. [--] But
if any man shall keep a continual watchful and severe eye upon
action, operation, and the use of knowledge, he may advise and take
notice what are the Forms, the disclosures whereof are fruitful and
important to the state of man. For as to the forms of substances, man
only except, of whom it is said, FORMAVIT HOMINEM DE LIMO TERRE, ET
SPIRAVIT IN FACIEM EJUS SPIRACULUM VITAE, and not as of all other
creatures, PRODUCANT AQUAE, PRODUCAT TERRA; the Forms of substances,
I say, as they are now by compounding and transplanting multiplied,
are so perplexed, as they are not to be inquired; no more than it
were either possible or to purpose to seek in gross the Forms of
those sounds which make words, which by composition and transposition
of letters are infinite. [--] But, on the other side, to inquire the
Form of those sounds or voices which make simple letters is easily
comprehensible; and being known, induceth and manifesteth the Forms
of all words, which consist and are compounded of them. In the same
manner to inquire the Form of a lion, of an oak, of gold; nay, of
water, of air, is a vain pursuit: but to inquire the forms of sense,
of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity and
levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures
and [37] qualities, which, like an alphabet, are not many, and of
which the essences, upheld by matter, of all creatures do consist; to
inquire, I say, the true Forms of these, is that part of metaphysique
which we now define of. [--] Not but that Physic doth make inquiry,
and take consideration of the same natures: but how? Only as to the
material and scient causes of them, and not as to the Forms. For
example; if the cause of whiteness in snow or froth be inquired, and
it be rendered thus, that the subtile intermixture of air and water
is:he cause, it is well rendered; but, nevertheless, is this the form
of whiteness? No; but it is the efficient, which is ever but
VEHICULUM FORMAE. [--] This part of Metaphysique I do not find
laboured and performed: whereat I marvel not; because I hold it not
possible to be invented by that course of invention which hath been
used; in regard that men, which is the root of all error, have made
too untimely a departure and too remote a recess from particulars.
6. But the use of this part of Metaphysique, which I report as
deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two respects: the
one, because it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge
the infinity of individual experience, as much as the conception of
truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint of VITA BREVIS, ARS
LONGA; which is performed by uniting the notions and conceptions of
sciences: for knowledges are as pyramids, whereof history is the
basis. So of natural philosophy, the basis is natural history; the
stage next the basis is physique; the stage next the vertical point
is metaphysique. As for the vertical point, OPUS QUOD OPERATUR DEUS A
PRINCIPIO USQUE AD FINEM, the summary law of nature, we know not
whether man's inquiry can attain unto it. But these three be the true
stages of knowledge, and are to them that are depraved no better than
the giant's hills:
Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam,
Scilicet atque Ossae frondosum involvere Olympum.
But to those who refer all things to the glory of God, they are as
the three acclamations, SANCTE, SANCTE, SANCTE! holy in the
description or dilatation of His works; holy in the connection or
concatenation of them: and holy in the union of them in a perpetual
and uniform law. [--] And therefore the speculation was excellent in
Parmenides and Plato, although but a speculation in them, that all
things by scale did ascend to unity. So then always that knowledge is
worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity; which appeareth
to be metaphysique; as that which considereth the simple Forms or
differences of things, which are few in number, and the degrees and
co-ordinations whereof make all this variety.
The second respect, which valueth and commendeth this part of
metaphysique, is that it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the
greatest liberty and possibility of works and effects. For physique
carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways, subject to many accidents
of impediments, imitating the ordinary flexuous courses of nature; but
LATAE UNDIQUE SUNT SAPIENTIBOS VIAE: to sapience, which was anciently
defined to be RERUM DIVINARUM ET HUMANARUM SCIENTIA, there is ever
choice of means. For physical causes give light to new invention in
SIMILI MATERIA; but whosoever knoweth any Form, knoweth the utmost
possibility of super-inducing that nature upon any variety of matter;
and so is less restrained in operation, either to the basis of the
matter, or the condition of the efficient; which kind of knowledge
Salomon likewise, though in a more divine sort, elegantly describeth:
NON ARCTABUNTUR GRESSUS TUI, ET CURRENS NON HABEBIS OFFENDICULUM. The
ways of sapience are not much liable either to particularity or
chance.
7.The second part of metaphysique is the inquiry of final causes,
which I am moved to report not as omitted, but as misplaced; and yet
if it were but a fault in order, I would not speak of it: for order
is matter of illustration, but pertaineth not to the substance of
sciences. But this misplacing hath caused a deficience, or at least a
great improficience in the sciences themselves. For the handling of
final causes mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath
intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and physical
causes, and given men the ccasion to stay upon these satisfactory and
specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of further
discovery. [--] For this I find done not only by Plato, who ever
anchoreth upon that shore, but by Aristotle, Galen, and others which
do usually likewise fall upon these flats of discoursing causes. FOR TO
SAY THAT THE HAIRS OF THE EYELIDS ARE FOR A QUICKSET AND FENCE ABOUT
THE SIGHT; or that THE FIRMNESS OF THE SKINS AND HIDES OF LIVING
CREATURES IS TO DEFEND THEM FROM THE EXTREMITIES OF HEAT OR COLD; or
that THE BONES ARE FOR THE COLUMNS OR BEAMS, WHEREUPON THE FRAMES OF
THE BODIES OF LIVING CREATURES ARE BUILT: or that THE LEAVES OF TREES
ARE FOR PROTECTING OF THE FRUIT; or that THE CLOUDS ARE FOR WATERING
OF THE EARTH; or that THE SOLIDNESS OF THE EARTH IS FOR THE STATION
AND MANSION OF LIVING CREATURES and the like, is well inquired and
collected in metaphysique, but in physique they are impertinent. Nay,
they are indeed but REMORAE, and hindrances to stay and slug the ship
from further sailing; and have brought this to pass, that the search
of the physical causes hath been neglected, and passed in silence.
[--] And therefore the natural philosophy of Democritus and some
others (who did not suppose a mind or reason in the frame of things,
but attributed the form thereof able to maintain itself to infinite
essays or proofs of nature, which they term FORTUNE) seemeth to me,
as far as I can judge by the recital and fragments which remain unto
us, in particularities of physical causes, more real and better
inquired than that of Aristotle and Plato; whereof both intermingled
final causes, the one as a part of theology, and the other as a part
of logic, which were the favourite studies respectively of both those
persons. Not because those final causes are not true, and worthy to be
inquired, being kept within their own province; but because their
excursions into the limits of physical causes hath bred a vastness
and [38] solitude in that track. For otherwise, keeping their
precincts and borders, men are extremely deceived if they think there
is an enmity or repugnancy at all between them. For the cause
rendered, that THE HAIRS ABOUT THE EYE-LIDS ARE FOR THE SAFEGUARD OF
THE SIGHT, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that PILOSITY IS
INCIDENT TO ORIFICES OF MOISTURE; MUSCOSI FONTES, etc. Nor the cause
rendered, THAT THE FIRMNESS OF HIDES IS FOR THE ARMOUR OF THE BODY
AGAINST EXTREMITIES OF HEAT OR COLD, doth not impugn the cause
rendered, THAT CONTRACTION OF PORES IS INCIDENT TO THE OUTWARDEST
PARTS, IN REGARD OF THEIR ADJACENCE TO FOREIGN OR UNLIKE BODIES: and
so of the rest: both causes being true and compatible, the one
declaring an intention, the other a consequence only. [--] Neither
doth this call in question, or derogate from Divine Providence, but
highly confirm and exalt it. For as in civil actions he is the
greater and deeper politique, that can make other men the instruments
of his will and ends, and yet never acquaint them with his purpose,
so as they shall do it and yet not know what they do, than he that
imparteth his meaning to those he employeth; so is the wisdom of God
more admirable, when nature intendeth one thing, and Providence
draweth forth another, than if He communicated to particular
creatures and motions the characters and impressions of His Providence.
And thus much for metaphysique: the latter part whereof I allow as
extant, but with it confined to his proper place.
VIII. 1. Nevertheless there remaineth yet another part of Natural
Philosophy, which is commonly made a principal part and holdeth rank
with Physique special and Metaphysique, which is Mathematique; but I
think it more agreeable to the nature of things and to the light of
order to place it as a branch of Metaphysique: for the subject of it
being quantity (not quantity indefinite, which is but a relative, and
belongeth to PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA, as hath been said, but quantity
determined or proportionable) it appeareth to be one of the essential
Forms of things; as that that is causative in nature of a number of
effects; insomuch as we see, in the schools both of Democritus and of
Pythagoras, that the one did ascribe figure to the first seeds of
things, and the other did suppose numbers to be the principles and
originals of things: and it is true also that of all other Forms, as
we understand Forms, it is the most abstracted and separable from
matter, and therefore most proper to Metaphysique; which hath
likewise been the cause why it hath been better laboured and inquired
than any of the other Forms, which are more immersed in matter. [--]
For it being the nature of the mind of man, to the extreme prejudice
of knowledge, to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as
in a champain region, and not in the inclosures of particularity; the
Mathematics of all other knowledge were the goodliest fields to satisfy
that appetite. [--] But for the placing of this science, it is not
much material: only we have endeavoured in these our partitions to
observe a kind of perspective, that one part may cast light upon
another.
2. The Mathematics are either pure or mixed. To the Pure
Mathematics are those sciences belonging which handle quantity
determinate, merely severed from any axioms of natural philosophy;
and these are two, Geometry and Arithmetic; the one handling quantity
continued, and the other dissevered. [--] Mixed hath for subject some
axioms or parts of natural philosophy, and considereth quantity
determined, as it is auxiliary and incident unto them. [--] For many
parts of nature can neither be invented with sufficient subtilty, nor
demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity, nor accommodated unto use
with sufficient dexterity, without the aid and intervening of the
mathematics; of which sort are perspective, music, astronomy,
cosmography, architecture, enginery, and divers others.
In the Mathematics I can report no deficience, except it be that
men do not sufficiently understand the excellent use of the Pure
Mathematics, in that they do remedy and cure many defects in the wit
and faculties intellectual. For if the wit be too dull, they sharpen
it; if too wandering, they fix it; if too inherent in the sense, they
abstract it. So that as tennis is a game of no use in itself, but of
great use in respect it maketh a quick eye and a body ready to put
itself into all postures; so in the Mathematics, that use which is
collateral and intervenient is no less worthy than that which is
principal and intended. [--] And as for the Mixed Mathematics, I may
only make this prediction, that there cannot fail to be more kinds of
them, as nature grows further disclosed. Thus much of Natural
Science, or the part of nature speculative.
3. For Natural Prudence, or the part operative of Natural
Philosophy, we will divide it into three parts, experimental,
philosophical, and magical; which three parts active have a
correspondence and analogy with the three parts speculative, natural
history, physique, and metaphysique: for many operations have been
invented, sometimes by a casual incidence and occurrence, sometimes
by a purposed experiment: and of those which have been found by an
intentional experiment, some have been found out by varying or
extending the same experiments, some by transferring and compounding
divers experiments the one into the other, which kind of invention an
empiric may manage.
Again, by the knowledge of physical causes there cannot fail to
follow many indications and designations of new particulars, if men
in their speculation will keep one eye upon use and practice. But
these are but coastings along the shore, PREMENDO LITTUS INIQUUM:
for it seemeth to me there can hardly be discovered any radical or
fundamental alterations and innovations in nature, either by the
fortune and essays of experiments, or by the light and direction of
physical causes. [--] If therefore we have reported Metaphysique
deficient, it must follow that we do the like of natural Magic, which
hath relation thereunto. For as for the Natural Magic whereof now
there is mention in books, containing certain credulous and
superstitious conceits [39] and observations of sympathies and
antipathies, and hidden properties, and some frivolous experiments,
strange rather by disguisement than in themselves; it is as far
differing in truth of nature from such a knowledge as we require, as
the story of King Arthur of Britain, or Hugh of Bordeaux, divers from
Caesar's Commentaries in truth of story. For it is manifest that
Caesar did greater things DE VERO than those imaginary heroes were
feigned to do; but he did them not in that fabulous manner. Of this
kind of learning the fable of Ixion was a figure, who designed to
enjoy Juno, the goddess of power; and instead of her had copulation
with a cloud, of which mixture were begotten centaurs and chimeras.
[--] So whosoever shall entertain high and vaporous imaginations,
instead of a laborious and sober inquiry of truth, shall beget hopes
and beliefs of strange and impossible shapes.
And therefore we may note in these sciences which hold so much of
imagination and belief, as this degenerate Natural Magic, Alchemy,
Astrology, and the like, that in their propositions the description
of the mean is ever more monstrous than the pretence or end. [--] For
it is a thing more probable, that he that knoweth well the natures of
weight, of colour, of pliant and fragile, in respect of the hammer, of
volatile and fixed in respect of the fire and the rest, may
superinduce upon some metal the nature and Form of gold by such
mechanique as belongeth to the production of the natures afore
rehearsed, than that some grains of the medicine projected should in
a few moments of time turn a sea of quicksilver or other material
into gold: so it is more probable that he that knoweth the nature of
arefaction, the nature of assimilation of nourishment to the thing
nourished, the manner of increase and clearing of spirits, the manner
of the depredations which spirits make upon the humours and solid
parts, shall by ambages of diets, bathings, anointings, medicines,
motions, and the like, prolong life, or restore some degree of youth
or vivacity, than that it can be done with the use of a few drops or
scruples of a liquor or receipt. To conclude, therefore, the true
Natural Magic, which is that great liberty and latitude of operation
which dependeth upon the knowledge of Forms, I may report deficient,
as the relative thereof is.
To which part, if we be serious, and incline not to vanities and
plausible discourse, besides the deriving and deducing the operations
themselves from Metaphysique, there are pertinent two points of much
purpose, the one by way of preparation, the other by way of caution:
the first is, that there be made a kalendar, resembling an inventory
of the estate of man, containing all the inventions, being the works
or fruits of nature or art, which are now extant, and whereof man is
already possessed; out of which doth naturally result a note, what
things are yet held impossible, or not invented: which kalendar will
be the more artificial and serviceable, if to every reputed
impossibility you add what thing is extant which cometh the nearest
in degree to that impossibility; to the end that by these optatives
and potentials man's inquiry may be more awake in deducing direction
of works from the speculation of causes: and secondly, that those
experiments be not only esteemed which have an immediate and present
use, but those principally which are of most universal consequence
for invention of other experiments, and those which give most light
to the invention of causes; for the invention of the mariner's
needle, which giveth the direction, is of no less benefit for
navigation than the invention of the sails which give the motion.
4. Thus have I passed through Natural Philosophy, and the
deficiencies thereof; wherein if I have differed from the ancient and
received doctrines, and thereby shall move contradiction; for my
part, as I affect not to dissent, so I purpose not to contend. If it
be truth,
Non canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylvae.
The voice of nature will consent, whether the voice of man do or
no. And as Alexander Borgia was wont to say of the expedition of the
French for Naples, that they came with chalk in their hands to mark
up their lodgings, and not with weapons to fight; so I like better
that entry of truth which cometh peaceably, with chalk to mark up
those minds which are capable to lodge and harbour it, than that which
cometh with pugnacity and contention.'
5. But there remaineth a division of natural philosophy according
to the report of the inquiry, and nothing concerning the matter or
subject; and that is positive and considerative; when the inquiry
reporteth either an assertion or a doubt. These doubts or NON LIQUETS
are of two sorts, particular and total. For the first, we see a good
example thereof in Aristotle's Problems, which deserved to have had a
better continuance; but so nevertheless as there is one point whereof
warning is to be given and taken. The registering of doubts hath two
excellent uses: the one, that it saveth philosophy from errors and
falsehoods; when that which is not fully appearing is not collected
into assertion, whereby error might draw error, but reserved in
doubt: the other, that the entry of doubts are as so many suckers or
sponges to draw use of knowledge; insomuch as that which, if doubts
had not preceded, a man should never have advised, but passed it over
without note, by the suggestion and solicitation of doubts, is made
to be attended and applied. But both these commodities do scarcely
countervail an inconvenience which will intrude itself, if it be not
debarred; which is, that when a doubt is once received, men labour
rather how to keep it a doubt still, than how to solve it; and
accordingly bend their wits. Of this we see the familiar example in
lawyers and scholars, both which, if they have once admitted a doubt,
it goeth ever after authorised for a doubt. But that use of wit and
knowledge is to be allowed, which laboureth to make doubtful things
certain, and not those which labour to make certain things doubtful.
[--] Therefore these calendars of doubts I commend as excellent
things; so that [40] there be this caution used, that when they be
thoroughly sifted and brought to resolution, they be from thenceforth
omitted, decarded, and not continued to cherish and encourage men in
doubting. To which kalendar of doubts or problems, I advise be
annexed another kalendar, as much or more material, which is a
calendar of popular errors: I mean chiefly in natural history, such
as pass in speech and conceit, and are nevertheless apparently
detected and convicted of untruth: that man's knowledge be not
weakened nor embased by such dross and vanity.
As for the doubts or NON LIQUETS general, or in total, I understand
those differences of opinions touching the principles of nature, and
the fundamental points of the same, which have caused the diversity
of sects, schools, and philosophies, as that of Empedocles,
Pythagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, and the rest. For although
Aristotle, as though he had been of the race of the Ottomans, thought
he could not reign except the first thing he did he killed all his
brethren; yet to those that seek Truth and not magistrality, it
cannot but seem a matter of great profit, to see before them the
several opinions touching the foundations of nature: not for any
exact truth that can be expected in those theories; for as the same
phenomena in astronomy are satisfied by the received astronomy of the
diurnal motion, and the proper motions of the planets, with their
eccentrics and epicycles, and likewise by the theory of Copernicus,
who supposed the earth to move (and the calculations are
indifferently agreeable to both), so the ordinary face and view of
experience is many times satisfied by several theories and
philosophies; whereas to find the real truth requireth another manner
of severity and attention. For as Aristotle saith, that children at
the first will call every woman mother, but afterward they come to
distinguish according to truth, so experience, if it be in childhood,
will call every philosophy mother, but when it cometh to ripeness, it
will discern the true mother. So as in the meantime it is good to see
the several glasses and opinions upon nature, whereof, it may be,
every one in some one point hath seen clearer than his fellows:
therefore I with some collection to be made, painfully and
understandingly, DE ANTIQUIS PHILOSOPHIIS, out of all the possible
light which remaineth to us of them: which kind of work I find
deficient. But here I must give warning, that it be done distinctly
and severally; the philosophies of every one throughout by
themselves; and not by titles packed and fagotted up together, as
hath been done by Plutarch. For it is the harmony of a philosophy in
itself which giveth it light and credence; whereas if it be singled
and broken, it will seem more foreign and dissonant. For as when I read
in Tacitus the actions of Nero, or Claudius, with circumstances of
times, inducements, and occasions, I find them not so strange; but
when I read them in Suetonius Tranquillus, gathered into titles and
bundles, and not in order of time, they seem more monstrous and
incredible: so is it of any philosophy reported entire, and
dismembered by articles. Neither do I exclude opinions of latter
times to be likewise represented in this kalendar of sects of
philosophy, as that of Theophrastus Paracelsus, eloquently reduced
into a harmony by the pen of Severinus the Dane: and that of Telesius
and his scholar Donius, being as a pastoral philosophy, full of
sense, but of no great depth; and that of Fracastorius, who, though
he pretended not to make any new philosophy, yet did use the
absoluteness of his own sense upon the old; and that of Gilbertus our
countryman, who revived, with some alterations and demonstrations,
the opinions of Xenophanes: and any other worthy to be admitted.
6. Thus have we now dealt with two of the three beams of man's
knowledge; that is, RADIUS DIRECTUS, which is referred to nature;
RADIUS REFRACTUS, which is referred to God, and cannot report truly
because of the inequality of the MEDIUM. There resteth RADIUS
REFLEXUS, whereby man beholdeth and contemplateth himself.
IX. 1. We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the
ancient oracle directeth us, which is the KNOWLEDGE OF OURSELVES;
which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth
us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural
philosophy in the intention of man, so nothwithstanding it is but a
portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature: and
generally let this be a rule, that all partitions of knowledges be
accepted; rather for lines and veins than for sections and
separations; and that the continuance and entireness of knowledge be
preserved. For the contrary hereof hath made particular sciences to
become barren, shallow, and erroneous, while they have not been
nourished and maintained from the common fountain. So we see Cicero
the orator complained of Socrates and his school that he was the
first that separated philosophy and rhetoric; whereupon rhetoric
became an empty and verbal art. So we may see that the opinion of
Copernicus touching the rotation of the earh, which astronomy itself
cannot correct, because it is not repugnant to any of the phenomena,
yet natural philosophy may correct. So we see also that the science
of medicine, if it be destituted and forsaken by natural philosophy,
it is not much better than an empirical practice. [--] With this
reservation therefore we proceed to human philosophy or humanity,
which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate or
distributively; the other congregate or in society. So as human
philosophy is either simple and particular, or conjugate and civil.
Humanity particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man
consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the body, and of
knowledges which respect the mind. But before we distribute so far, it
is good to constitute. For I do take the consideration in general and
at large of human nature to be fit to be emancipate and made a
knowledge by itself: not so much in regard of those delightful and
elegant discourses which have been made of the dignity of man, of his
miseries, of his state and life, and the like adjuncts of his [41]
common and undivided nature; but chiefly in regard of the knowledge
concerning the sympathies and concordances between the mind and body,
which being mixed cannot be properly assigned to the sciences of
either.
2. This knowledge hath two branches: for as all leagues and amities
consist of mutual intelligence and mutual offices, so this league of
mind and body hath these two parts; how the one discloseth the other,
and how the one worketh upon the other; discovery and impression.
[--] The former of these hath begotten two arts, both of prediction
or prenotion; whereof the one is honoured with the inquiry of
Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. And although they have of
later time been used to be coupled with superstitious and fantastical
arts, yet being purged and restored to their true state, they have
both of them a solid ground in nature, and a profitable use in life.
The first is physiognomy, which discovereth the disposition of the
mind by the lineaments of the body: the second is the exposition of
natural dreams, which discovereth the state of the body by the
imaginations of the mind. In the former of these I note a deficience.
For Aristotle hath very ingeniously and diligently handled the factures
of the body, but not the gestures of the body, which are no less
comprehensible by art, and of greater use and advantage. For the
lineaments of the body do disclose the disposition and indination of
the mind in general; but the motions of the countenance and parts do
not only so, but do further disclose the present humour and state of
the mind and will. For as your majesty saith most aptly and
elegantly, AS THE TONGUE SPEAKETH TO THE EAR SO THE GESTURE SPEAKETH
TO THE EYE. And therefore a number of subtle persons, whose eyes do
dwell upon the faces and fashions of men, do well know the advantage
of this observation, as being most part of their ability; neither can
it be denied, but that it is a great discovery of dissimulations, and
a great direction in business.
3. The latter branch, touching impression, hath not been collected
into art, but hath been handled dispersedly; and it hath the same
relation or antistrophe that the former hath. For the consideration
is double: either how, and how far the humours and sects of the body
do alter or work upon the mind; or again, how and how far the
passions or apprehensioos of the mind do alter or work upon the body.
The former of these hath been inquired and considered as a part and
appendix of medicine, but much more as a part of religion or
superstition: for the physician prescribeth cures of the mind in
phrensies and melancholy passions; and pretendeth also to exhibit
medicines to exhilarate the mind, to confirm the courage, to clarify
the wits, to corroborate the memory, and the like: but the scruples
and superstitions of diet and other regimen of the body in the sect
of the Pythagoreans, in the heresy of the Manicheans, and in the law
of Mohomet, do exceed. So likewise the ordinances in the ceremonial
law, interdicting the eating of the blood and the fat, distinguishing
between beasts clean and unclean for meat, are many and strict. Nay
the faith itself being clear and serene from all clouds of ceremony,
yet retaineth the use of fastings, abstinences, and other macerations
and humiliations of the body, as things real, and not figurative. The
root and life of all of which prescripts is, besides the ceremony,
the consideration of that dependency which the affections of the mind
are submitted unto upon the state and disposition of the body. And if
any man of weak judgment do conceive that this suffering of the mind
from the body doth either question the immortality, or derogate from
the sovereignty of the soul, he may be taught in easy instances that
the infant in the mother's womb is compatible with the mother and yet
separable; and the most absolute monarch is sometimes led by his
servants and yet without subjection. As for the reciprocal knowledge,
which is the operation of the conceits and passions of the mind upon
the body, we see all wise physicians, in the prescriptions of their
regiments to their patients, do ever consider ACCIDENTIA ANIMI as of
great force to further or hinder remedies or recoveries: and more
especially it is an inquiry of great depth and worth concerning
imagination, how and how far it altereth the body proper of the
imaginant. For although it hath a manifest power to hurt, it
followeth not it hath the same degree of power to help; no more than
a man can conclude, that because there be pestilent airs able
suddenly to kill a man in health, therefore there should be sovereign
airs able suddenly to cure a man in sickness. But the inquisition of
this part is of great use, though it needeth, as Socrates said, A
DELIAN DIVER, being difficult and profound. But unto all this
knowledge DE COMMUNI VINCULO, of the concordances between the mind
and the body, that part of inquiry is most necessary, which
considereth of the seats and domiciles which the several faculties of
the mind do take and occupate in the organs of the body; which
knowledge hath been attempted, and is controverted, and deserveth to
be much better inquired. For the opinion of Plato, who placed the
understanding in the brain, animosity (which he did unfitly call
anger, having a greater mixture with pride) w the heart, and
concupiscence or sensuality in the later, deserveth not to de
despised; but much less to be allowed. So then we have constituted,
as in our own wish and advice, the inquiry touching human nature
entire, as a just portion of knowledge to be handled apart.
X.1. The knowledge that concerneth man's body is divided as the
good of man's body is divided, unto which it referreth. The good of
man's body is of four kinds, Health, Beauty, Strength, and Pleasure: so
the knowledges are Medicine, or art of Cure; art of Decoration, which
is called Cosmetic; art of Activity, which is called Athletic; and
art Voluptuary, which Tacitus truly calleth ERUDITUS LUXUS. This
subject of man's body is of all other things in nature most
susceptible of remedy; but then that remedy is most susceptible of
error. For the same subtility of the subject doth cause large
possibility and easy failing; and therefore the inquiry ought to be
the more exact.
[42] 2. To speak therefore of Medicine, and to resume that we have
said, ascending a little higher: the ancient opinion that man was
MICROCOSMUS, an abstract or model of the world, hath been
fantastically strained by Paracelsus' and the alchemists, as if there
were to be found in man's body certain correspondences and parallels,
which should have respect to all varieties of things, as stars,
planets, minerals, which are extant in the great world. But thus much
is evidently true, that of all substances which nature hath produced,
man's body is the most extremely compounded. For we see herbs and
plants are nourished by earth and water; beasts for the most part by
herbs and fruits; man by the mesh of beasts, birds, fishes, herbs,
grains, fruits, water, and the manifold alterations, dressings, and
preparations of the several bodies, before they come to be his food
and aliment. Add hereunto, that beasts have a more simple order of
life, and less change of affections to work upon their bodies: whereas
man in his mansion, sleep, exercise, passions, hath infinite
variations: and it cannot be denied but that the Body of man of all
other things is of the most compounded mass. The Soul on the other
side is the simplest of substances, as is well expressed:
Purumque reliquit
Aethereum sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem.
So that it is no marvel though the soul so placed enjoy no rest, if
that principle be true, that MOTUS RERUM EST RAPIDUS EXTRA LOCUM,
PLACIDUS IN LOCO. But to the purpose: this variable composition of
man's body hath made it as an instrument easy to distemper; and
therefore the poets did well to conjoin Music and Medicine in Apollo,
because the office of Medicine is but to tune this curious harp of
man's body and to reduce it to harmony. So then the subject being so
variable, hath made the art by consequence more conjectural; and the
art being conjectural hath made so much the more place to be left for
imposture. For almost all other arts and sciences are judged by acts,
or masterpieces, as I may term them, and not by the successes and
events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue of his pleading, and not
by the issue of the cause; the master of the ship is judged by the
directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage;
but the physician, and perhaps the politique, hath no particular acts
demonstrative of his ability, but is judged most by the event; which
is ever but as it is taken: for who can tell if a patient die or
recover, or if a state be preserved or ruined, whether it be art or
accident? And therefore many times the impostor is prized, and the
man of virtue taxed. Nay, we see the weakness and credulity of men is
such, as they will often prefer a mountebank or witch before a
learned physician. And therefore the poets were clear-sighted in
discerning this extreme folly, when they made Aesculapius and Circe
brother and sister, both children of the sun, as in the verses,
Ipse repertorem medicine talis et artis
Fulmine PHOEBIGENAM Stygias detrusit ad undas:
And again,
Dives inaccessos ubi SOLIS FILIA lucos, etc.
For in all times, in the opinion of the multitude, witches and old
women and impostors have had a competition with physicians. And what
followeth? Even this, that physicians say to themselves as Salomon
expresseth it upon a higher occasion; IF IT BEFALL TO ME AS BEFALLETH
TO THE FOOLS, WHY SHOULD I LABOUR TO BE MORE WISE? And therefore I
cannot much blame physicians, that they use commonly to intend some
other art or practice, which they fancy more than their profession.
For you shall have of them antiquaries, poets, humanists, statesmen,
merchants, divines, and in every of these better seen than in their
profession; and no doubt upon this ground, that they find that
mediocrity and excellency in their art maketh no difference in profit
or reputation towards their fortune; for the weakness of patients,
and sweetness of life, and nature of hope, maketh men depend upon
physicians with all their defects. But nevertheless, these things
which we have spoken of, are courses begotten between a little
occasion, and a great deal of sloth and default; for if we will
excite and awake our observation, we shall see in familiar instances
what a predominant faculty the subtilty of spirit hath over the
variety of matter or form: nothing more variable than faces and
countenances: yet men can bear in memory the infinite distinctions of
them; nay, a painter with a few shells of colours, and the benefit of
his eye and habit of his imagination, can imitate them all that ever
have been, are, or may be, if they were brought before him: nothing
more variable than voices; yet men can likewise discern them
personally: nay, you shall have a buffoon or PANTOMIMUS, who will
express as many as he pleaseth. Nothing more variable than the
differing sounds of words; yet men have found the way to reduce them
to a few simple letters. So that it is not the insufficiency or
incapacity of man's mind, but it is the remote standing or placing
thereof, that breedeth these mazes and incomprehensions: for as the
sense afar off is full of mistaking, but is exact at hand, so is it
of the understanding; the remedy whereof is, not to quicken or
strengthen the organ, but to go nearer to the object; and therefore
there is no doubt but if the physicians will learn and use the true
approaches and avenues of nature, they may assume as much as the poet
saith:
Et quoniam variant morbi, variabimus artes;
Mille mali species, mille salutis erunt.
Which that they should do, the nobleness of their art doth deserve;
well shadowed by the poets, in that they made Aesculapius to be the
son of the sun, the one being the fountain of life, the other as the
second stream: but infinitely more honoured by the example of our
Saviour, who made the body of man the object of His miracles, as the
soul was the object of His doctrine. For we read not that ever He
vouchsafed to do any miracle about honour or money, except that one
for giving tribute to Caesar; but only about the preserving,
sustaining, and healing the body of man.
3. Medicine is a science which hath been, as we [43], more
professed than laboured, and yet more laboured than advanced; the
labour having been, in my judgment, rather in circle than in
progression. For I find much iteration, but small addition. It
considereth causes of diseases, with the occasions or compulsions;
the diseases themselves, with the accidents; and the cares, with the
preservations. The deficiencies which I think good to note, being a
few of many, and those such as are of a more open and manifest
nature, I will enumerate, and not place.
4. The first is the discontinuance of the ancient and serious
diligence of Hippocrates, which used to set down a narrative of the
special cases of his patients, and how they proceeded, and how they
were judged by recovery or death. Therefore having an example proper
in the father of the art, I shall not need to allege an example
foreign, of the wisdom of the lawyers, who are careful to report new
cases and decisions for the direction of future judgments. This
continuance of medicinal history I find deficient; which I understand
neither to be so infinite as to extend to every common case, nor so
reserved as to admit none but wonders: for many things are new in the
manner, which are not new in the kind; and if men will intend to
observe, they shall find much worthy to observe.
5. In the inquiry which is made by Anatomy, I find much deficience:
for they inquire of the parts, and their substances, figures, and
collocations; but they inquire not of the diversities of the parts,
the secrecies of the passages, and the seats or nestlings of the
humoors, nor much of the footsteps and impressions of diseases: the
reason of which omission I suppose to be, because the first inquiry
may be satisfied in the view of one or a few anatomies: but the
latter, being comparative and casual, must arise from the view of
many. And as to the diversity of parts, there is no doubt but the
facture or framing of the inward parts is as full of difference as
the outward, and in that is the CAUSE CONTINENT of many diseases;
which not being observed, they quarrel many times with humours, which
are not in fault; the fault beings in the very frame and mechanic of
the part, which cannot be removed by medicine alterative, but must be
accommodate and palliate by diets and medicines familiar. As for the
passages and pores, it is true which was anciently noted, that the
more subtle of them appear not in anatomies, because they are shut
and latent in dead bodies, though they be open and manifest in live:
which being supposed, though the inhumanity of ANATOMIA VIVORUM was
by Celsus justly reproved; yet in regard of the great use of this
observation, the inquiry needed not by him so slightly to have been
relinquished altogether, or referred to the casual practices of
surgery; but mought have been well diverted upon the dissection of
beasts alive, which notwithstanding the dissimilitude of their parts,
may sufficiently satisfy this inquiry. And for the humours, they are
commonly passed over in anatomies as purgaments; whereas it is most
necessary to observe, what cavities, nests, and recptacles the
humours do find in the parts, with the differing kind of the humour
so lodged and received. And as for the footsteps of diseases and
their devastations of the inward parts, imposthumations,
exulcerations, discontinuations, putrefactions, consumptions,
contractions, extensions, convulsions, dislocations, obstructions,
repletions, together with all preternatural substances, as stones,
carnosities, excrescences, worms, and the like; they ought to have
been exactly observed by multitude of anatomies, and the contribution
of men's several experiences, and carefully set down, both
historically, according to the appearances, and artificially, with a
reference to the diseases and symptoms which resulted from them, in
case where the anatomy is of a defunct patient; whereas now, upon
opening of bodies, they are passed over slightly and in silence,
6. In the inquiry of diseases, they do abandon the cures of many,
some as in their nature incurable, and others as past the period of
cure; so that Sylla and the Triumvirs never proscribed so many men to
die, as they do by their ignorant edicts: whereof numbers do escape
with less difficulty than they did in the Roman proscriptions.
Therefore I will not doubt to note as a deficience, that they inquire
not the perfect cures of many diseases, or extremities of diseases;
but pronouncing them incurable, do enact a law of neglect, and exempt
ignorance from discredit.
7. Nay, further, I esteem it the office of a physician not only to
restore health, but to mitigate pain and dours; and not only when
such mitigation may conduce to recovery, but when. it may serve to
make a fair and easy passage: for it is no small felicity which
Augustus Cesar was wont to wish to himself, that same Euthanasia; and
which was especially noted in the death of Antoninus Pius, whose
death was after the fashion and semblance of a kindly and pleasant
sleep. So it is written of Epicurus, that after his disease was
judged desperate, he drowned his stomach and senses with a large
draught and ingurgitation of wine; whereupon the epigram was made,
HINC STYGIAS EBRIUS HAUSIT AQUAS, he was not sober enough to taste
any bitterness of the Stygian water. But the physicians contrariwise
do make a kind of scruple and religion to stay with the patient after
the disease is deplored; whereas, in my judgment, they ought both to
inquire the skill and to give the attendances for the facilitating
and assuaging of the pains and agonies of death.
8. In the consideration of the cures of diseases, I find a
deficience in the receipts of propriety, respecting the particular
cures and diseases: for the physicians have frustrated the fruit of
tradition and experience by their magistralities, in adding, and
taking out, and changing QUID PRO QUO, in their receipts at their
pleasures; commanding so over the medicine, as the medicine cannot
command over the diseases: for except it be treacle and MITHRIDATUM,
and of late DIASCORDIUM, and a few more, they tie themselves to no
receipts severely and religiously: for [44] as to the confections of
sale which are in the shops, they are for readiness and not for
propriety; for they are upon general intention of purging, opening,
comforting, altering, and not much appropriate to particular
diseases: and this is the cause why empirics and old women are more
happy many times in their cures than learned physicians, because they
are more religious in holding their medicines. Therefore here is the
deficience which I find, that physicians have not, partly out of
their own practice, partly out of the constant probations reported in
books, and partly out of the traditions of empirics, set down and
delivered over certain experimental medicines for the cure of
particular diseases, besides their own conjectural and magistral
descriptions. For as they were the men of the best composition in the
state of Rome, which either being consuls inclined to the people, or
being tribunes inclined to the senate; so in the matter we now handle,
they be the best physicians, which being learned incline to the
traditions of experience, or being empirics incline to the methods of
learning.
9. In preparation of medicines, I do find strange, especially
considering how mineral medicines have been extolled, and that they
are safer for the outward than inward parts, that no man hath sought
to make an imitation by art of natural baths and medicinable
fountains: which nevertheless are confessed to receive their virtues
from minerals: and not so only, but discerned and distinguished from
what particular mineral they receive tincture, as sulphur, vitriol,
steel, or the like; which nature, if it may be reduced to
compositions of art, both the variety of them will be increased, and
the temper of them will be more commanded.
10. But lest I grow to be more particular than is agreeable either
to my intention or to proportion, I will conclude this part with the
note of one deficience more, which seemeth to me of greatest
consequence; which is, that the prescripts in use are too compendious
to attain their end: for, to my understanding, it is a vain and
flattering opinion to think any medicine can be so sovereign or so
happy, as that the receipt or use of it can work any great effect
upon the body of man. It were a strange speech, which spoken, or
spoken oft, should reclaim a man from a vice to which he were by
nature subject: it is order, pursuit, sequence, and interchange of
application, which is mighty in nature; which although it require more
exact knowledge in prescribing, and more precise obedience in
observing, yet is recompensed with the magnitude of effects. And
although a man would think, by the daily visitations of the
physicians, that there were a pursuance in the cure: yet let a man
look into their prescripts and ministrations, and he shall find them
but inconstancies and every day's devices, without any settled
providence or project. Not that every scrupulous or superstitious
prescript is effectual, no more than every straight way is the way to
heaven; but the truth of the direction must precede severity of
observance.
11. For Cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts effeminate: for
cleanness of body was ever esteemed to proceed from a due reverence
to God, to society, and to ourselves. As for artificial decoration,
it is well worthy of the deficiencies which it hath; being neither
fine enough to deceive, nor to use, nor wholesome to please.
12. For Athletic, I take the subject of it largely, that is to say,
for any point of ability whereunto the body of man may be brought,
whether it be of activity, or of patience; whereof activity hath two
parts, strength and softness; and patience likewise hath two parts,
hardness against wants and extremities, and endurance of paw or
torment; whereof we see the practices in tumblers, in savages, and in
those that suffer punishment: nay, if there be any other faculty
which falls not within any of the former divisions, as in those that
dive, that obtain a strange power of containing respiration, and the
like, I refer to it this part. Of these things the practices are
known, but the philosophy that concerneth them is not much inquired;
the rather, I think, because they are supposed to be obtained, either
by an aptness of nature, which cannot be taught, or only by continual
custom, which is soon prescribed: which though it be not true, yet I
forbear to note any deficiencies: for the Olympian games are down
long since, and the mediocrity of these things is for use; as for the
excellency of them it serveth for the most part but for mercenary
ostentation.
13. For arts of pleasure sensual, the chief deficience in them is
of laws to repress them. For as it hath been well observed, that the
arts which flourish in times while virtue is in growth, are military;
and while virtue is in state, are liberal; and while virtue is in
declination, are voluptuary; so I doubt that this age of the world is
somewhat upon the decent of the wheel. With arts voluptuary I couple
practices joculary; for the deceiving of the senses is one of the
pleasures of the senses. As for games of recreation, I hold them to
belong to civil life and education. And thus much of that particular
human philosophy which concerns the body, which is but the tabernacle
of the mind.
XI. 1. For Human Knowledge which concerns the Mind, it hath two
parts; the one that inquireth of the substance or nature of the soul
or mind, the other that inquireth of the faculties or functions
thereof. [--] Unto the first of these, the considerations of the
original of the soul, whether it be native or adventive, and how far
it is exempted from laws of matter, and of the immortality thereof,
and many other points, do appertain: which have been not more
laboriously inquired than variously reported; so as the travail
therein taken seemeth to have been rather in a maze than in a way.
But although I am of opinion that this knowledge may be more really
and soundly inquired, even in nature, than it hath been; yet I hold
that in the end it must be bounded by religion, or else it will be
subject to deceit and delusion: for as the substance of the soul in
the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven [45] and
earth by the benediction of a PRODUCAT but was immediately inspired
from God: so it is not possible that it should be (otherwise than by
accident) subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the
subject of philosophy; and therefore the true knowledge of the nature
and state of the soul must come by the same inspiration that gave the
substance. Unto this part of knowledge touching the soul there be two
appendices; which, as they have been handled, have rather vapoured
forth fables than kindled truth, Divination and Fascination.
2. Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into artificial
and natural; whereof artificial is, when the mind maketh a prediction
by argument, concluding upon signs and tokens; natural is when the
mind hath a presention by an internal power, without the inducement
of a sign. Artificial is of two sorts; either when the argument is
coupled with a derivation of causes, which is rational; or when it is
only grounded upon a coincidence of the effect, which is
experimental: whereof the latter for the most part is superstitious;
such as were the heathen observations upon the inspection of
sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of bees; and such as
was the Chaldean astrology, and the like. For artificial divination,
the several kinds thereof are distributed amongst particular
knowledges. The astronomer hath his predictions, as of conjunctions,
aspects, eclipses, and the like. The physician hath his predictions
of death, of recovery, of the accidents and issues of diseases. The
Politique hath his predictions; O URBEM VENALEM, ET CITO PERITURAM,
SI EMPTOREM INVENERIT! which stayed not long to be performed, in
Sylla first, and after in Cesar. So as these predictions are now
impertinent, and to be referred over. But the divination which
springeth from the internal nature of the soul, is that which we now
speak of; which hath been made to be of two sorts, primitive and by
influxion. Primitive is grounded upon the supposition, that the mind,
when it is withdrawn and collected into itself, and not diffused into
the organs of the body, hath some extent and latitude of prenotion;
which therefore appeareth most in sleep, in ecstasies, and near
death, and more rarely in waking apprehensions; and is induced and
furthered by those abstinences and observances which make the mind
most to consist in itself By infixion, is grounded upon the conceit
that the mind, as a mirror or glass, should take illumination from
the foreknowledge of God and spirits: unto which the same regiment
doth likewise conduce. For the retiring of the mind within itself, is
the state which is most susceptible of d
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